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THE “FAMILY”—AND  
“FAMILIES” IN LAW: 
A REVIEW OF ARCHANA PARASHAR 
AND FRANCESCA DOMINELLO,  
THE FAMILY IN LAW 
 
Mary Jane Mossman* 
 
Once upon a time, things were easy for 
family lawyers. Their object of study was 
clearly marked out (marriage, divorce, and 
their consequences), while theoretical debate 
about the subject was rare or non-existent. 
Although it is difficult to locate this Garden 
of Eden in real time, most family lawyers 
would share the perception that things have 
become more complex of late. . . . [And] 
allied to this, there has been an explosion of 
theoretical interest in law and the family.1 
 
  Two decades after this assessment by John Dewar, 
The Family in Law offers a significant and sophisticated 
appraisal of the law’s engagement “in the construction of 
ideas about the family and familial relationships”.2 The 
authors’ basic premise is that legal analysis continues to 
utilize a limited conception of “the family”, one that 
                                                          
*  Professor Emerita, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1  John Dewar, “Family, Law and Theory” (1996) 16:4 Oxf J Leg Stud 
725 at 725. See also David Morgan, Family Connections: An 
Introduction to Family Studies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).   
2  Archana Parashar & Francesca Dominello, The Family in Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) at 2. 
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emphasizes the nuclear family as the norm, thereby 
contributing to an assumption that “family” is primarily “a 
private institution whose main function is to provide 
economic and emotional support” for its members. More 
specifically, the authors suggest that lawyers, judges and 
legal academics all tend to engage in legal reasoning that, 
subtly or otherwise, reifies “the nuclear family” as the 
normative ideal, even in the context of clear evidence of 
many different family forms.3 Thus, the authors’ goal is to 
critique how “family law functions in ways that preserve 
the nuclear family and continue to perpetuate heterosexual 
normativity, cultural bias, age, sex, class hierarchies, and 
the sexual division of labour within and outside the 
family.”4 In doing so, moreover, the authors attempt to 
“challenge the conventional boundaries of family law” in 
legal textbooks to reveal how “the law [especially in the 
courts] makes explicit choices in regulating family life.”5 
Thus, their analysis suggests that “family law constructs 
discourses about families in a way that hierarchies found 
in contemporary society are maintained rather than 
challenged.”6 
 
Although The Family in Law focuses on “family 
law” in Australia, it offers a thoughtful analysis for 
lawyers, judges and legal academics in Canada as well, 
since many of the same challenges are evident in both 
jurisdictions. For example, Bill C-78 was introduced by 
Canada’s Minister of Justice in the House of Commons on 
                                                          
3  Ibid at 2–3. 
4  Ibid at 3. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid at 4 [emphasis added]. 





22 May 2018, with a number of significant proposals to 
amend the substance and process of divorces (and 
including additional amendments to other federal statutes 
as well). For example, Bill C-78 includes proposals to 
replace the terminology of custody and access with 
terminology related to parenting; establish a non-
exhaustive list of criteria for determining “the best interest 
of the child;” create duties for parties and legal advisors to 
encourage the use of family dispute resolution processes; 
introduce measures to assist courts to address family 
violence; establish a framework regarding the relocation of 
a child; and simplify processes such as those related to 
family support obligations.7  
 
In the context of proposed reforms in Canada, it 
seems significant that the federal government in Australia 
had also announced a comprehensive review of Australia’s 
Family Law Act8 in September 2017, to be undertaken by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission. The Review’s 
terms of reference recognized the “profound social changes 
to the needs of families” since the 1970s (when the 
Australian Family Law Act was first enacted), including the 
greater diversity of family structures, the importance of 
ensuring that the FLA meets the needs of contemporary 
families and individuals, and the importance of public 
                                                          
7  Bill C-78, An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and 
Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment, 
Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential 
amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, Explanatory 
Notes (first reading 22 May 2018). 
8  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 1975/53 [FLA]. 
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confidence in the family law system.9 More specifically, 
the terms of reference directed an exploration of some of 
the same issues included in Bill C-78 in Canada: for 
example, the importance of dignity and privacy for 
separating families, the need to encourage dispute 
resolution early, the importance of protecting children of 
separating families, the pressures (including financial 
pressures) on family law courts, and the benefits of 
engaging appropriately skilled professionals. In assessing 
appropriate reforms, moreover, the Review will consider 
“the appropriate, early and cost-effective resolution of all 
family law disputes;” “whether the adversarial court 
system offers the best way to support the safety of families 
and resolve matters;” and the possibility of devising 
opportunities for less adversarial resolution of parenting 
and property disputes.10 Thus, in both the Australian and 
Canadian contexts, significant reform proposals 
concerning families and law are currently underway. 
Although some aspects of these reforms focus on 
substantive issues, it appears that process concerns may be 
paramount in both jurisdictions: the search for cheaper, 
faster settlements that do not require courts and judges.  
 
By contrast, a primary critique for the authors of 
The Family in Law is the need to recognize that family law 
should not be understood as merely a dispute resolution 
                                                          
9  Attorney-General for Australia, News Release, “First Comprehensive 





10  Ibid. 





mechanism for private parties. In posing these challenges 
for family law, moreover, the authors explore whether the 
concept of justice, which traditionally operates in the 
“public” sphere, should be extended to the “private” sphere 
of the family. They conclude that this issue requires 
attentiveness not only to goals of gender equality but also 
to the needs of the many families that do not conform to 
the nuclear family model.11 In addition, the authors note the 
irony that family law supports an ideology of love, 
altruism, and personal fulfilment when a family 
relationship is formed and while it continues; however, “at 
the end of the very same relationship it adopts another 
stand—that family law is no more than a dispute resolution 
mechanism. . . . It does not wish to know anything about 
messy emotions, sacrifices or altruism.”12 In this way, 
family law manages to appear to be value-neutral: 
 
ADR is often presented to consumers as 
cheaper, more time efficient and providing 
better access to justice in contrast to 
litigation, but even if these claims are true the 
issue for us as legal thinkers is how 
conducive it is to achieving a fair family law. 
. . . [While the Family Law Act promotes 
autonomy and privacy, reinforcing the family 
as a private institution,] ADR reproduces a 
range of social hierarchies that come together 
                                                          
11  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 21–25, citing Susan Moller Okin, 
Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Will 
Kymlicka, “Rethinking the Family” (1991) 20:1 Philos Public Aff 77.  
12  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 27, citing Carol Smart, The Ties 
that Bind: Law, Marriage, and the Reproduction of Patriarchal 
Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 220 
and function to legitimise gender hierarchies 
that exist in the nuclear family form [as well 
as hierarchies of class, race and sexuality that 
exist in society].13 
  
Thus, applying their argument that legal knowledge 
is inevitably constructed, the authors explain how theory is 
essential to the creation of a just family law; that is, 
lawyers, judges, and academics must always “make 
choices about the categories of analysis,” and the issues 
and the way to analyse them: for example, whether to 
promote gender justice goals in family disputes, as opposed 
to merely improving the cost and time efficiency of the 
family law system. In this way, they conclude that 
“responsibility for our ideas lies with us.”14  
 
[A]ny analysis of family law needs to address 
the question of whether reform to the 
substantive law has the potential to transcend 
the inequities that exist between men, women 
and children, and for people of different 
sexualities, cultures and socioeconomic 
backgrounds in contemporary social 
                                                          
13  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 60. See also Rosemary Hunter, 
“Adversarial Mythologies: Policy Assumptions and Research 
Evidence in Family Law” (2003) 30:1 JL & Soc'y 156. 
14  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 29–30. The authors engage with 
ideas in Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-77, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980) to explore the need to embrace theory in family 
law. See also David Sugarman, “Legal Theory, the Common Law 
Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition” in William Twining, 
ed, Legal Theory and Common Law (New York: Basil Blackwell, 
1986) at 26. 





arrangements. . . . [A] study of family law 
provides a good opportunity to illustrate the 
relationships between the law, society and the 
state, and insight on how family law could be 
different.15 
 
In critiquing the law’s positivist account of its rules 
as objective and value-free, the authors engage with 
interdisciplinary scholarship to explore three fundamental 
themes: the diversity of family forms, the sexual division 
of labour, and the public/private divide. In the authors’ 
view, family law should not be understood as merely a 
dispute resolution mechanism for private parties.16 
 
The Family in Law offers a comprehensive 
overview of contemporary issues about “family law” in 
Australia. The authors are scrupulous in providing details 
of statutes and cases relating to marriage (and marriage-
like relationships), divorce, financial relations, spousal 
maintenance, private ordering of financial relations (family 
contracts), disputes about children, children’s roles in court 
proceedings; child maintenance and support (including 
social security); regulation of families (abortion and child 
protection); and adoption and reproductive technologies. 
Yet, at the same time, their exploration of these issues 
                                                          
15  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 11. 
16  The book’s second chapter focuses on family law institutions, 
including the Family Court of Australia, which has jurisdiction in all 
the states and territories as a result of the assignment of family law 
matters to the federal government pursuant to Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), 1900, s 51. Issues about child 
protection and family violence, however, are part of the jurisdiction of 
states and territories. 
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includes rigorous attentiveness to underlying policy issues, 
which are assessed in terms of wide-ranging legal and 
interdisciplinary scholarship and engaged critique—
especially in relation to the themes identified earlier: the 
law’s narrow focus on the nuclear family, the inequities of 
the sexual division of labour, and the need to reconsider the 
public/private spheres in the family law context. Overall, 
the book provides a detailed and engaged assessment of 
contemporary issues about the family in law, especially in 
relation to fundamental theories about the role of law in 
society and the need to incorporate interdisciplinary 
scholarship to achieve better outcomes in law. In this way, 
the book offers solid and persuasive arguments that create 
new ways of understanding the problems and potential of 
law for families in the twenty-first century.  
 
For Canadian lawyers, judges, and academics and 
their students, three subjects appear particularly relevant. 
One is the extent to which the authors explore challenges 
of diversity in families, focusing particularly on race and 
sexuality. In relation to marriage, for example, the book 
focuses on the limited recognition of Aboriginal customary 
marriages, and how embedded assumptions about marriage 
as monogamous resulted in a recommendation by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission for only limited 
recognition of customary marriages (some of which are 
polygamous). The authors challenge this limitation, 
concluding that “treating [the concept of monogamous 
marriage] as unchangeable in the process of ‘recognising’ 
another familial arrangement, should be seen as an exercise 





of power rather than a mere description of a natural state of 
affairs.”17 
 
Similarly, the authors critique the High Court’s 
decision in 2013 in Commonwealth v. Australian Capital 
Territory concerning same-sex marriage.18 Although the 
federal Marriage Act included recognition of only 
opposite-sex marriages, the High Court concluded that this 
federal statute nonetheless “covered the field”, so that a 
statute enacted by the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
to permit same-sex marriages in its Territory was ultra 
vires—in spite of intransigence on the part of the federal 
Parliament to amend the Marriage Act to achieve greater 
inclusivity. The authors argued that the omission of same-
sex marriage in the federal Act could have permitted the 
High Court to acknowledge a “gap”, (that is, that the 
federal Act did not cover the field), thereby validating the 
ACT statute. Moreover, as they noted, the High Court’s 
decision failed to mention that the same-sex marriages, 
which had been performed pursuant to the ACT statute, 
were rendered void by its decision, thus resulting in 
                                                          
17  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 47–49. The book also includes 
extensive discussion about child custody determinations involving 
Aboriginal children in Chapter 9, especially the Australia, Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Bringing Them Home: 
Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander children from their Families (1997), online 
<www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/bringing-them-home-report-
1997>. In addition, there is discussion in Chapter 11 about child 
welfare and Aboriginal children, including the over-representation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in care, at 399–404. 
Many of these issues resonate with similar challenges in Canada. 
18  Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory, [2013] HCA 55, 250 
CLR 441.  
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 224 
discrimination on the basis of sexuality.19 In all of these 
cases, of course, the authors emphasized how legal 
approaches to the (lack of full) recognition of “other” 
family forms reinforces the primacy of the nuclear family 
in law. Moreover, while same-sex marriage was eventually 
recognized by Canada’s federal Parliament in 2005, and 
customary Aboriginal marriages have achieved recognition 
for some purposes in Canadian provinces, the patchwork 
of legal rights and responsibilities for transgender persons 
and cohabiting adults in “family” relationships continue to 
create challenges for some Canadian families.20 
 
A second way in which this book opens up new 
ways of thinking about family law matters is in its 
treatment of child support issues, and particularly the need 
to take into account broader societal arrangements, that is, 
by extending the boundaries of “family law”. Chapter 10 
focuses on the how federal statutes concerning child 
                                                          
19  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 49–51. The authors also argue that 
an expanded definition of “marriage” in federal legislation could also 
include “de facto” (cohabiting) relationships at 51–52. 
20  In relation to same-sex marriage, see Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 
33 and Mark D Walters, “Incorporating Common Law into the 
Constitution of Canada: Egale v Canada and the Status of Marriage” 
(2003) 41:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75. In relation to Aboriginal customary 
marriages, see Bradford Morse, “Indian and Inuit Family Law and the 
Canadian Legal System” (1980) 8:2 Am Indian L Rev 199. Ontario 
enacted the Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment 
Because of Gender Identity or Gender Expression, 2012, SO 2012, c 
7; and gender identity is included as a protected ground of 
discrimination in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and the Northwest 
Territories. However, the law affecting cohabitees differs across 
Canada: see Robert Leckey, “Cohabitation and Comparative Method” 
(2009) 72:1 Mod L Rev 48. 





support obligations and their administrative arrangements 
reflect how “the discourse of neoliberalism has translated 
into the context of private responsibility for the child”; as 
well, the authors critique how child support provisions 
“normalise the idea of the nuclear family as the ideal form 
of family, but in a way that promotes parenting as a gender-
neutral activity, which fails to account for the reality of the 
effects of the sexual division of labour.”21 Of course, these 
critiques about child support arrangements (and their 
inevitable links to needed spousal maintenance)22 have also 
been voiced in Canada.23 What is particularly significant 
for this book, however, is its effort to assess these “private” 
family support obligations in the larger context of the 
“public” social security system in Australia. According to 
the authors, there is an “urgent need to refocus the issue on 
the social responsibility for child support rather than 
making it a (private) primary responsibility of the poorest 
mothers and fathers in our society.”24 
 
The book includes analysis of governmental 
inquiries and reform processes that resulted in the current 
                                                          
21  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 334. 
22  Ibid. See also Margaret Harrison, “Continuous Parenting and the Clean 
Break: The Aftermath of Marriage Breakdown” (1988) 23:3 Austl J 
Social Issues 208; Regina Graycar, “Towards a Feminist Position of 
Maintenance” (1987) Refractory Girl: A Women’s Studies Journal 7; 
and Margrit Eichler, “The Limits of Family Law Reform” (1990) 7 Can 
Fam LQ 59. 
23  Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law and Women’s Work (Don Mills, 
Ont: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
24  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 354. See also Mary Jane Mossman, 
“‘Running Hard to Stand Still’: The Paradox of Family Law Reform” 
(1994) 17:1 Dalhousie LJ 5.  
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arrangements for child support, focusing particularly on the 
invocation of the “shared parenting” principle for which 
there was scant evidence in family “practices”.25 Indeed, 
there are also arguments that suggest that the stated goals 
of child support reforms (reducing child poverty and 
reducing the cost to the state for children following their 
parents’ separation) have not been met.26 In addition, the 
authors suggest that the needs of lone mothers are 
completely unrecognized because of law’s preference for 
the nuclear family: 
 
The ‘clean break’ philosophy in family law is 
that the parties should fend for themselves 
after relationship breakdown. If that is not 
possible, the law provides for ongoing 
maintenance. The idea is to contain the cost 
of relationship breakdown between the 
parties. This approach treats social welfare as 
a last resort measure. [However,] social-
welfare provisions also play a significant role 
                                                          
25  See Helen Rhoades & Susan Boyd, “Reforming Custody Laws: A 
Comparative Study” (2004) 18:2 Int'l JL Pol'y & Fam 119; Rhoades, 
“Posing as Reform: The Case of the Family Law Reform Act” (2000) 
14:2 Austl J Fam L 142; Kay Cook & Kristin Natalier, “Selective 
Hearing: The Gendered Construction and Reception of Inquiry 
Evidence” (2014) 34:4 Crit Soc Pol’y 515. The authors also reference 
a comparative study, which highlighted how Australia’s formal equal 
opportunity policy in education and employment was not replicated in 
families with children where traditional gender roles were reinforced: 
Lyn Craig & Killian Mullan, “Parenthood, Gender and Work-Family 
Time in the United States, Australia, Italy, France and Denmark” 
(2010) 72:5 J Marriage Fam 1344. 
26  See Belinda Fehlberg et al, Australian Family Law: The Contemporary 
Context, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 424–25. 





in legitimising gender inequalities, while also 
entrenching other social hierarchies of class 
and race.27 
 
Perhaps because of the different constitutional 
arrangements in Canada, where financial provision for 
spouses and children at family breakdown—as well as 
employment insurance and social welfare—are sometimes 
shared/sometimes exclusive responsibilities of either the 
federal and provincial governments, Canadian family law 
most often does not extend its boundaries to detailed 
examination of relationships between “private” family 
support and “public” entitlements to social security—even 
though these relationships are often critical concerns for 
alleviating financial dependency in families.28 In this way, 
the focus on relationships between “family” support and 
“societal” support in The Family in Law points to an 
                                                          
27  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 363. The authors explain how 
neoliberal ideology suggests that cutting welfare costs will generate 
economic growth and employment, and that the New Right has often 
been embraced by fathers’ rights groups. For many in these groups, the 
goal is that “women should be forced to be financially reliant on men,” 
and this reliance should be linked to the traditional family unit: ibid at 
364–65. See also Miranda Kaye & Julie Tolmie, “Fathers’ Rights 
Groups in Australia and their Engagement with Issues in Family Law” 
(1998) 12:1 Austl J Fam L 19. 
28  For examples, see Mary Jane Mossman, “Conversations about 
Families in Canadian Courts and Legislatures: Are there ‘Lessons’ for 
the United States?” (2003) 32:1 Hofstra L Rev 171; Mossman, “Child 
Support or Support for Children? Re-Thinking the ‘Public’ and 
‘Private’ in Family Law” (1997) 46 UNBLJ 63; and Mossman, 
“Family Law and Social Assistance: Rethinking Equality” (with 
Morag MacLean) in Patricia Evans & Gerda Wekerle, eds, Women and 
the Canadian Welfare State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997) 117. 
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economic reality that deserves much more attention in both 
Canada and Australia. 
 
A third aspect of this book of some significance to 
Canada is Chapter 5, which focuses on property relations 
at family breakdown. As the authors suggest at the outset, 
the “most significant legal reform in the family laws of 
western states has been the granting of a share of property 
to the financially dependent spouse, usually the wife.”29 At 
the same time, the authors argue that there is a “disjuncture 
between the law’s discourse on marriage as a partnership 
and the unequal gendered financial consequences of 
[family] breakdown”; according to the authors, this 
disjunction occurs because of “the concepts of nuclear 
family, family as a private institution, and the claims of 
family law as merely intended to provide a neutral dispute 
resolution mechanism.”30 Subsection 79(2) of the Family 
Law Act in Australia requires a court to adjust title to 
spouses’ property interests only if it is “just and equitable” 
to do so. In assessing this requirement, the statute includes 
criteria, particularly focused on the spouses’ respective 
“contributions” and “needs”. This approach is similar to 
the property sharing provisions of some provinces in 
Canada, although most provincial statutes in Canada create 
a principle of “equal sharing” that establishes a baseline for 
                                                          
29  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 151. Although Australia’s Family 
Law Act initially provided for property sharing for married couples 
only, the same regime was extended to eligible “de facto” (cohabiting) 
couples in 2008: see Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial 
Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth), 2008/115. 
30  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 151.  





the exercise of judicial discretion.31 By contrast, no such 
statutory guidance exists in Australia’s legislation, and an 
early precedent established that the concept of equal shares 
was not the “starting point” in the exercise of judicial 
discretion there.32 In this context, the authors suggest that 
the cases reflect how “judicial authority to alter individual 
interests in property is a radical departure from the 
approach to property acquisition and entitlement found in 
property law more generally [because] a central tenet of 
capitalist liberal societies is that property has economic or 
money value and those who can pay for it, own it.”33  
  
In this context, Australian courts seem to have 
considered business activities as more valuable than non-
financial caregiving work and have tended to allocate 
property interests accordingly. In In the Marriage of 
Ferraro, for example, a trial judge divided significant 
family wealth so that the husband (who had experienced 
considerable success in business) received 70% and the 
wife (who had cared for the home and children) received 
                                                          
31  See e.g. Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25. Subsection 81(a) provides 
that both partners are entitled to property and responsible for debts and 
(b) creates an undivided half interest in all property as tenants in 
common at separation. Section 85 provides for excluding some 
property, such as pre-marriage property, inheritances, and gifts. 
Section 65 permits a court to reallocate property interests in accordance 
with “fairness,” and subsection 95(2) provides a list of factors to be 
considered in relation to an “unequal division”; the test is “significant 
unfairness.” 
32  Mallet v Mallet, [1984] HCA 21, 156 CLR 605. 
33  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 158–59. The authors indicate that 
the omission of any justification in the Family Law Act for this “radical 
departure” has created dissatisfaction for both men and women at 
separation: ibid at 159. 
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30%; the judge expressly rejected the wife’s claim for an 
equal share, stating that an allocation of equal shares in this 
case would be: 
 
. . . akin to treating the contributions of the 
creator of Sissinghurst Gardens, whose 
breadth of vision and imagination, talent, 
drive and endeavours led to the creation of 
. . . most beautiful gardens in England, with 
that of the gardener who assisted with the 
tilling of the soil and the weeding of the 
beds.34 
 
By contrast, Canadian statutes tend to require equal 
sharing of property as the starting point, although judicial 
discretion may still result in unequal shares.35 For the 
authors of The Family in Law, it is this reliance on judicial 
discretion to achieve “just and equitable” outcomes that 
represents a major flaw in Australia’s current statutory 
                                                          
34  In the Marriage Of: Renata Ferraro Appellant/Wife and Ruggero 
Ferraro Respondent/Husband, [1992] FamCA 64 at para 139, 16 Fam 
LR 1 at 28. The appeal court altered the wife’s share to 37.5%, while 
confirming the decision in Mallet that there was no presumption of 
equality as a starting point: The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 171. 
35  See e.g. Martin v Martin (1992), 67 BCLR (2d) 219, 1992 CarswellBC 
137 (WL Can) (BCCA), decided pursuant to earlier legislation in 
British Columbia. Some provinces, such as Ontario, have statutes 
based on “equalization of values” of property, with a compensating 
money payment to the spouse whose net family property is the lesser 
in value. In this context, litigation often focuses on whether property 
can be “excluded” from the calculation: see e.g. Caratun v Caratun 
(1992), 42 RFL (3d) 113, 1992 CarswellOnt 287 (WL Can), where the 
Ontario Court of Appeal excluded the value of the husband’s dental 
degree because it was not traditional property and its valuation for 
purposes of equalization would be “unfairly speculative”. 





regime. However, after considering whether different 
statutory guidelines might create better outcomes, the 
authors conclude that the fundamental problem is the 
conception of the family as a private unit, thus requiring 
the full cost of relationship breakdown to be borne by the 
spouses. As they suggest, “this assumption sits uneasily 
with the reality of dependencies created through the sexual 
division of labour, and it also absolves the state from 
establishing a safety net that sufficiently provides for the 
financially vulnerable party.”36 Clearly, these conclusions 
may be equally apt in Canada, even where there are 
statutory guidelines and a starting point of “equal shares”, 
perhaps especially for the poorest and most vulnerable 
families. For the authors, fundamental reform of family 
property requires acknowledgement of societal structures 
that work to create dependencies:  
 
[T]he study of family law has to be combined 
with study of other laws and disciplines so 
that the institutions that continue to view the 
worker as an unencumbered individual, with 
no caretaking responsibilities, can be 
changed. . . . [A] conception of a fair family 
law may require that policy-makers address 
the causes and consequences of the 
diminished earning capacity of caregivers, 
rather than only devising property ownership 
regimes.37  
 
                                                          
36  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 177. 
37  Ibid at 189. 
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The Family in Law represents a formidable 
accomplishment in its comprehensive and knowledgeable 
assessment of the need for fundamental reform of law’s 
role in relation to a wide range of issues for families in 
Australia. The book provides extensive references to legal 
and interdisciplinary commentary on family law principles 
and processes, along with an engaged and critical 
assessment of the need to reform Australian statutes and 
judicial approaches in cases. Although the book’s 
organization presents its discussion in three parts (Chapters 
1–2 focus on theoretical ideas about law and the family and 
family law institutions; Chapters 3–10 focus on marriage, 
divorce, and corollary matters; while Chapters 11–12 focus 
on abortion, child protection, adoption, and reproductive 
technologies), the organization appears to replicate a 
primary emphasis on issues relating to marriage and 
divorce. To some extent, this emphasis is inevitable in the 
context of the current law, of course —and the authors’ 
focus on child support in the wider context of social 
security offers an often under-analyzed approach to 
economic security.  
 
At the same time, the authors might find it 
interesting to explore the arrangement of one of Canada’s 
family law books for students: its title is Families and the 
Law (not Family Law). Its content reflects the diversity of 
families and the crucial relationship between “private” 
ordering and “public” policy, especially in relation to race, 
class and gender, and economic security; and its 
organization traces the law’s relationship to families in 
three sequential developments:  
 





1. the creation of families (including 
marriage and cohabitation, but also 
parenting in relation to biological birth, 
adoption and reproductive technology);  
2. the regulation by law of ongoing 
(intact) families (including child care 
arrangements, child protection, family 
violence, and elder abuse); and 
3. the dissolution of families (divorce, 
agreements, dispute resolution, 
property, and spousal and child 
support.38   
 
As these comments suggest, The Family in Law 
creates an excellent opportunity for conversations about 
families and law among lawyers, judges, and legal 
academics in Australia and Canada. Although these 
conversations have often occurred in the past, the existence 
of the review by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
and the introduction of reform of Canada’s Divorce Act just 
a few months later may present a new opportunity for 
rethinking the essential nature of law’s relationship to 
families, and the potential for reforms that address 
fundamental needs for families. As Susan Boyd suggested 
some years ago: 
 
[We need] to study the efficacy of legal 
change vis-à-vis the family in light of the 
                                                          
38  Mary Jane Mossman et al, Families and the Law: Cases and 
Commentary, 2nd ed (Concord, Ont: Captus Press, 2015). See also 
Susan B Boyd, Book Review of Families and the Law: Cases and 
Commentary by Mary Jane Mossman, (2012–13) 28:1 Can J Fam L 
105 re an earlier edition of Families and the Law. 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 234 
wider social context . . . [and to be reminded] 
that what legislation and judges say is not 
always an accurate description of reality, due 
to the sometimes false assumptions which 
our legal system contains about the family 
and family members. Students can learn to 
take a critical perspective on policy-oriented 
legal approaches which ignore the complex 
nature of social change, of which legal 
change is only one part.39 
    
Shifting legal and policy makers’ views from a 
narrow focus on dispute resolution to a more fundamental 
understanding of the ways in which it is “families” that 
create and sustain the fabric of communities, the viability 
of the State, and the well-being of all of us as individuals 
is not an easy task. For those involved in rethinking law’s 
relationship to families in Canada and Australia, however, 
The Family in Law is both essential and inspiring. As the 
authors suggested, “[T]he choices we make can be 
constrained by contextual factors, but they can also mean 
the difference between contributing to oppressive practices 
and promoting fairer laws and policies that are responsive 




                                                          
39  Susan B Boyd, “Teaching Policy Issues in Family Law” (1989) 8:1 
Can J Fam L 1 at 15 (editorial). 
40  The Family in Law, supra note 2 at 434. 
